A bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard. Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so. Dollarization is good when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high, monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns, and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate. However, a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization undesirable. The results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the IMF as International LOLR.
I Introduction
We would never put ourselves in a position where we envisioned actions that we would take would be of assistance to the rest of the world but to the detriment of the United States Dollarization means that the country adopts the currency of another country (for example, the dollar) as a means of payment and unit of account.
A currency board is typically de ned by a legislative commitment to exchange domestic currency for the reserve currency at a xed rate and by the requirement that (a major proportion of) monetary liabilities be backed by the reserve currency. Estonia considers its currency boards as a step towards joining the European Monetary Union. Lithuania plans to link its currency board to the euro in 2001. Dollar-based currency boards have been established also in Djibouti [1949] and the member countries of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank [1965] . The one in Alan Greenspan to a congressional panel in 1999 (IHT, Jan.19, 2000) The aim of this paper is to examine the trade-offs associated with the move to dollarization from the perspective of the stability of the banking system in a small open economy.
Dollarization is a reality in several countries and is on the agenda for others. Arrangements short of full dollarization, or adoption of the currency of another country, include currency boards, with a rigid link between domestic currency and foreign reserves , and partial dollarization. Dollarization is not very common but is gaining ground. Starting with Panama in 1904, Ecuador embraced full dollarization in 2000, after the collapse of its nancial system in 1998-99 at the staggering cost up to 22 percent of GDP, and El
Salvador very recently in January 2001. Guatemala is also planning to circulate the dollar and Estonia is thinking about euroization . Currency boards were a more common arrangement in the British colonial past and presently they are in operation, among others, in Argentina [1991] , Hong Kong [1983] and in Lithuania [1994] , linked to the dollar, as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina [1997] , Estonia [1992] and Bulgaria [1997] , linked to the DM/euro. Turkey moved recently to a quasi currency board arrangement. Furthermore, Brunei Darussalam [1967] is linked to the Singapore dollar. See Santiprabhob [1997] and Ghosh, Gulde and
Wolf [2000] for a description of the arrangements in the different currency boards. See IMF [1999] . See for example Caprio and Klingebiel [1996] and Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu [1997] . For example, Calomiris and Powell [2000] state that the banking sector suffered from ineffective regulation and supervision and repeated, forced government rescues contributed signi cantly to Argentina s past scal and in ationary problems . A related problem (in Argentina, for example) is the lack of legal protection that a supervisor has when attempting to discipline a bank in trouble. Then even if the perceived problem is serious the bank may be allowed to continue or even granted help. See World Bank [1998] .
See Calomiris [1998] , Eichengreen [1999] , Fisher [1999] and the Symposium on Global Financial Instapartial dollarization is prevalent in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Turkey with dollar deposits equal to more than 30 percent of the total.
The adoption of a common currency reduces the transaction costs of trade (see, for example, Rose [2000] ) and if the country adopts a stable currency it commits to a stable monetary policy. The latter may be particularly important in emergent economies. However, dollarization has the potential cost of abandoning monetary policy and the exchange rate as policy instruments and compromising the capacity to bail out the domestic banking system. It is worth noting that banking crises can be very costly, with bail out costs up to 10 percent or even 20 percent of GDP. We concentrate attention in this paper on the bailout issue.
When it comes to bailouts, not being able to help may have its bene ts. As Grossman and Hart [1982] pointed out, the threat of bankruptcy and loss of private bene ts can motivate managers to exert effort and improve the performance of the rm. The possibility of a bailout reduces this incentive effect and indirectly encourages managerial shirking and risk taking. It has been argued repeatedly that a major problem in emerging markets is the implicit or explicit guarantee of a bailout in the event of a banking crisis (think of Argentina, Mexico or Thailand). In emerging markets, moral hazard problems are widespread and the economy relies in an important way on the monitoring effort of bankers who provide nance to entrepreneurial projects. It is precisely the fear of bank closure or change of management that makes bankers, who derive bene ts from running the bank, cautious and willing to expend effort to monitor projects. Journal of Economic Perspectives bility of the , 1999, 13 (4), 3-65, for different perspectives on the problem. For example, in Argentina in the 1980s the average term in office for a central bank governor was less than a year despite the fact that the legal term was four years. See Chapter 19 in Cukierman [1992] .
In a monetary economy, the central bank can bail out distressed banks by extending a line of credit. The optimal central bank policy must balance the costs and bene ts of bailouts. On the one hand, a bailout avoids costly and inefficient liquidation of entrepreneurial projects. On the other hand, the prospect of a bailout reduces the banks incentive to monitor. Ex ante, the central bank would like to make a commitment to close the bank in some cases (for example, if the project returns are very low) and to extend credit in others (for example, if the returns are only moderately low). Unfortunately, the optimal policy suffers from a lack of time-consistency. Ex ante it is optimal for the central bank to commit to a policy of nancial discipline. Ex post, it may be optimal to avoid costly liquidation by allowing banks and projects to continue in every case. Note that ex post continuation is both efficient and welcomed by the banker, who derives bene ts from running the bank.
To sum up, a time-consistent policy by the central bank may lead to excessive bailouts.
Anticipating this lack of nancial discipline, bankers will not make sufficient effort to screen and monitor projects. The result will be excessive nancing of inferior projects, inadequate monitoring, and poor project performance.
A commitment to nancial discipline can sometimes be maintained if the central bank has a strong incentive to build a reputation. In emerging markets, however, it may be difficult for central banks to build a reputation for disciplining banks, because the central bankers effective horizon is short due to political instability. A central bank that cannot build a reputation will face the time-inconsistency problem.
How can dollarization alleviate this problem? Dollarization represents a commitment to a limited use of the lender of last resort (LOLR) facility, understood in a broad sense. Dollarization implies that there cannot be recourse to monetary base expansion for bailouts.
In the extreme case of a small open economy, dollarization means that banking contracts are written in real (dollar) terms. In a dollarized regime, help to the banking system In this paper, we study the costs and bene ts of dollarization from the point of view of providing market discipline for the banking sector. The model we use integrates the banking instability model à la Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and the moral hazard view (see Krugman [1998] for example) of crises. In the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig [1983] , banks are risk sharing institutions that transform liquid liabilities (demand deposits) into illiquid assets (investments in long-term projects). In Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and much of the following literature, panics are generated by self-ful lling prophecies. This coordination problem is not addressed in this paper. In our model, which is based on 12 12 This is consistent with the evidence provided in Gorton [1988] and in Kaminsky and Reinhart [1999] . Bhattacharya and Jacklin [1988] , and Postlewaite and Vives [1987] present an information-based view of bank runs which is close to the one developed in the paper. Allen and Gale [1998] , crises are the result of exogenous shocks to asset returns. The model is augmented by introducing the possibility of moral hazard. The model may be of independent interest because it combines the two elements (moral hazard and nancial crises) that have been studied separately in the literature.
We approach the analysis of optimal policy in three steps. First, as a benchmark
in Section 3, we analyze the policy of a planner with full commitment who uses complete contracts to nance risky projects. We characterize the incentive-efficient policy and show, among other things, that the planner chooses the minimum probability of termination (default) that is required to satisfy the incentive constraint (induce the optimal effort from the bank manager).
Secondly, we examine in Section 4 a competitive banking sector in a real economy where banks use (incomplete) demand deposits to nance risky projects. Banks are implicitly assumed to be able to commit to demand deposits. The competitive equilibrium is thirdbest (worse than the incentive-efficient allocation) for two reasons. First, the probability of default may be too high, leading to excessive costly liquidation. Secondly, even if the probability of default is the same as in the incentive-efficient solution, the allocation of risk sharing may be inefficient because of the restriction to (incomplete) deposit contracts.
Thirdly, we examine in Section 5 a competitive banking sector in a monetary economy. Banks use nominal demand deposits (i.e., demand deposits denominated in domestic currency) to nance risky projects. The central bank, through its control of the money supply, can in uence the real value of deposits and hence the probability of default. When project returns are low, extension of credit to the bank allows the depositors to be paid off in depreciated currency. If the central bank can commit to a monetary policy ex ante, the incentive-efficient allocation can be achieved through a competitive banking sector.
However, in the absence of full commitment, the central bank always extends credit ex Comparison of these scenarios (in Section 6) allows us to weigh the costs and bene ts of dollarization. In the case of a small, open economy, dollarization corresponds to the real economy, in which market discpline may be excessive but does support high effort by the bank managers. Full use of the LOLR facility in a non-dollarized economy corresponds to the case of a monetary economy without central bank commitment. Market discipline is too low to support high effort. Neither of these cases is second-best (incentive-efficient).
Which is to be preferred depends on the parameters of the economy. We study also how partial (and credible) dollarization could implement the incentive-efficient solution. The main contribution of the paper is to provide a framework in which to analyze the impact of the different parameters on the tradeoff between the bene ts of market discipline and the costs of liquidation.
Whether it is better to dollarize from the point of view of banking stability is an empirical question. In a rst attempt to measure the costs and bene ts of dollarization, in Section 7 we survey a number of countries where dollarization can be bene cial prima facie, suggest some empirical counterparts to the parameters of our model, and identify which countries are the leading candidates for dollarization.
Section 2 presents the model and concluding remarks, including a discussion of the potential role of a reformed IMF, close the paper.
The basic structure of the model is drawn from Allen and Gale [1998] . There are three dates . There is a single good that can be used for consumption and investment.
There are two kinds of investment technology, a safe, liquid investment and a risky, illiquid investment. The liquid investment is modeled as a storage technology: one unit of the good invested at date produces one unit of the good at date , for . The illiquid investment should be thought of as a risky project that takes two periods to mature. The returns to the risky project are linear: one unit of the good invested at date yields units We assume that the risky project requires the supervision of a manager. In particular, the probability distribution of returns to the risky asset depends on effort undertaken by the manager. For simplicity we assume that the manager s effort takes two values, and the random variable has a probability density function (with support ) that depends on the value of chosen at date . The cost of effort to the manager is if he chooses and it is zero if he chooses . The cost can be interpreted as the bene t that the manager derives from selecting bad projects (like giving loans to friends and family or straight embezzlement). The manager also receives a bene t from continuing the project until date . Thus, the manager s expected The modelization is similar to Tirole [1993, 1994] . Dewatripont and Tirole [1994] , in a somewhat more complex model, provide a discussion of the reasons why managers prefer continuation even in the presence of monetary bene ts.
payoff is where is the probability that the project is continued at date .
The manager s effort cannot be observed and, therefore, his willingness to undertake effort will depend on the relationship between his effort and the probability that the project is continued at date . The present formulation is overly simpli ed but it is the simplest way of presenting the manager s choice of effort and allows us to focus on the bankruptcy point as the critical variable. Despite this simpli cation, the characterization of the contracting problem is far from trivial and the model allows for a trade-off between too much and too little discipline.
Suppose that a planner were given the task of choosing an optimal risk-sharing arrangement. Since all agents are ex ante identical, it is natural for the planner to treat all agents alike and maximize their ex ante expected utility. Let denote the portfolio chosen at date , where is the investment in the risky asset and is the investment in the safe asset, let denote effort level, and let denote the probability of continuation at date 1 when takes the value . The optimal consumption allocation will depend only on the aggregate wealth of the economy. Let denote the optimal consumption allocation, where is the consumption at date when .
The planner s problem can be solved in stages. First, we solve the problem taking as given the rst-period decisions regarding and and the realized value of . If the project is discontinued, the aggregate wealth available is and the problem solved by the planner is subject to The gist of the proof is the following. The necessary conditions for optimization require that with equality if . Given concavity of this means that the incentive constraint is automatically satis ed. Now, if returns are low, , then we are in the case and the consumptions of early and late consumers are equated (for the late consumers of the asset is carried to date which added to yields the desired ). If returns
The rst constraint is the budget constraint at date . It requires that the consumption of the early and late consumers be less than or equal to the liquidated value of the portfolio.
Although the project is discontinued at date , the planner is assumed to pay out the consumption to the late consumers at date using the storage technology. This allows him to take advantage of the fact that early consumers cannot wait and so cannot imitate late consumers. As a result, only one incentive constraint has to be satis ed. The second constraint is the incentive constraint. It requires that late consumers do not bene t from imitating early consumers (a late consumer can pretend to be an early consumer, receive at date and save it until date using the storage technology).
The solution to this problem is and the maximum utility from discontinuing the project is Next, suppose that the project is continued at date . Then the planner has units of the good at date and units of the good at date . He chooses a consumption allocation to solve the following problem: subject to
The rst constraint is the budget constraint at date , the second constraint is the budget constraint at date , and the third constraint is the incentive constraint. The solution to this problem is: and the maximum utility from continuing the project is The manager always prefers to continue the project at date . Whether the consumers are better off on average continuing the project depends on the parameters of the model.
Since we are interested in the problem of time consistency, it makes sense to assume that the consumers are, on average, better off continuing the project ex post. That is, for all
For very small values of , this condition must be satis ed, so it will be satis ed everywhere if is increasing in .
Now suppose that the planner has chosen a portfolio at date and consider the choice of effort. If the planner chooses , there is no problem implementing this choice.
Since the manager prefers not to make an effort, the incentive constraint will automatically be satis ed. Further, since it is ex post inefficient to liquidate the project, it is optimal to choose for all . In this case the planner solves
Denote by the value of the program. Note that is independent of , and
The interesting case, therefore, is the implementation of . The planner chooses to maximize the expected utility of the representative depositor subject to the incentive compatibility constraint to insure that the bank manager exerts effort. The incentive constraint says that taking high effort increases the manager s expected continuation bene t by an amount that is greater than or equal to his cost of effort. Intuition suggests that, if making an effort is optimal, it is because higher effort is associated with higher outcomes ( 1) ( 1)
Otherwise it would be optimal to put . This, however, would not satisfy the incentive constraint For a given portfolio , suppose that is increasing in and the MLRP holds. Then the optimal continuation probability is, for some constant given by for for and the incentive constraint for the banker is given by for the risky project on average. So we should reward the manager for good outcomes and should punish him for bad outcomes. We can show that under natural assumptions, the optimal continuation probability does have the form of a cutoff rule. If is decreasing in we say that the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds. In this case, rst order stochastically dominates where denotes the cumulative distribution function of given the effort level . The next result gives sufficient conditions for the optimal rule to be a cutoff rule (see Gale and Vives (2001) for the proof).
Assuming that it is optimal to induce the planner must nd a portfolio and a cutoff point that solve the following problem: subject to
Denote the solution by . Note that the planner wants to keep as low as possible. Indeed, if a rst-best allocation can be achieved and it will be optimal to put . It follows that the incentive constraint must be binding at an optimum. Thus, is uniquely determined by the incentive constraint:
. Note that is weakly increasing in and tends to as tends to zero. When effort is irrelevant, for all , it is impossible to achieve in an incentivecompatible way and is not de ned. A sufficient condition is that the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion be larger than .
Having determined the value of , we can choose to maximize the objective function subject only to the rst-period budget constraint. A typical solution is depicted in Figure I . For low returns, , the project is discontinued and .
For higher returns we are in the continuation region and consumptions follow the pattern described above.
Denote by the value of the program when . Our maintained assumption in the paper is that to induce managerial effort is optimal, that is, .
Under certain regularity conditions , the optimal investment in the risky project is increasing in (as it becomes cheaper to liquidate the project). This is always the case if the project is liquidated whenever it loses money, . Let us assume so. Assume also that when . This means that the inequality above holds for all whenever .
We introduce a competitive banking sector in which banks are coalitions of agents that pool their endowments and hire a manager to monitor their investment.
Like the planner, banks will maximize the expected utility of the representative member subject to the investment technology and the manager s incentive constraint. Unlike the planner, banks cannot make the consumption allocation directly contingent on the state of nature. Instead, they are forced to use non-contingent deposit contracts. (The consumption allocation will be contingent on in the event that the bank cannot meet its commitments, of course.) A deposit contract offers the bank members a choice of units of consumption at date or the residual units of consumption left at date .
The bank invests in a portfolio at date and the manager chooses the level of effort . If the bank can afford to pay to all the agents who want to withdraw at date 
(1) This is not the only equilibrium of the depositors game at date . Indeed, there could be a panic equilibrium in which all depositors withdraw. This can be avoided with suspension of convertibility (c.f., Diamond and Dybvig [1983] Obviously, the solution requires that , since the incentive constraint must be satis ed. The banking solution will tend to have and, consequently, a higher probability of failure. The reason is that the incentive-efficient solution chooses the smallest compatible with preserving incentives for the banker while at the banking solution the selection of the cutoff determines also the level of for a given portfolio choice (see Figure II) It is worth remarking that the (third-best) banking equilibrium is not the same as the second-best, even if . If the probability of continuing is lower in the third best, the bank manager will be strictly worse off than in the second best, even though the depositors are indifferent. Of course, the costs of nancial distress may also be felt in the non-nancial sector of the economy (Bernanke and Gertler [1989] ). If so, then the gap between and will have consequences far more serious than the effect on the manager s utility (private bene ts) of discontinuing the project. The assumption that is just a cheap way of capturing the idea that nancial fragility has real costs.
Note, moreover, that even if the expected utility typically attained at the banking contract will be strictly less than at the incentive-efficient solution, . This is because the risk sharing provided by the banking contract is sub-optimal, even when the bank is solvent. A typical solution to the banking contract is depicted in Figure II . Up to now we have assumed that the banking contract was speci ed in real terms (in units of consumption). Let us now introduce a central bank that supplies money and therefore makes it possible to write nominal contracts in terms of the domestic currency.
The dollar is the reserve currency and serves as the unit of account (one dollar is worth one unit of consumption). The central bank produces the domestic currency at no cost.
For simplicity we imagine that the central bank controls the price level or, equivalently, the exchange rate, by standing ready to exchange the domestic currency for goods (or dollars) at the speci ed price level in period . To avoid arbitrage it is necessary that the return to holding money between dates and be less than or equal to the return to holding the safe asset. This implies that the price level must be nondecreasing .
Moreover, since the only function of money, besides its use as a unit of account, is to be a store of value between dates and , we assume that it is optimal to hold money, that is, (if then banks would be willing to store goods only).
The deposit contract now promises units of currency to anyone withdrawing in period and, as before, late withdrawers are residual claimants of whatever is left in the representative bank in the last period.
We assume that the central bank is benevolent and that it wants to maximize the expected utility of the representative investor. The central bank knows all public information available at any date. In particular, the central bank observes the realization of in period . A central bank policy is therefore a function that determines the price level for any realization .
We will consider two scenarios. In the rst, the central bank can commit to a speci c monetary policy at period for the rest of the game. In the second, the central bank is not able to commit to a speci c policy. The fact that these actions result in the incentive-efficient allocation proves that in equilibrium they are optimal for each of the players. It is optimal that banks default only when necessary; the incentive constraint ensures that the manager s effort choice is optimal; the bank s choice of is optimal by de nition, given the function , and the CB cannot do better than the incentive compatible allocation.
The situation is very different if the central bank cannot commit to a monetary policy at period 0. The no-commitment scenario is represented by the following extensive form game .
Stage 1: Individual banks choose the the portfolio and deposit .
Stage 2: Given the choices of the individual banks, bank managers decide whether to exert high or low effort.
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Alternatively, we could think that the central bank provides help to the bank in the range in the form of a (zero interest) domestic currency loan. This help avoids a run that forces the bank to liquidate. Late consumers withdraw at and they end up holding all the money, which they exchange in period for consumption goods. The players actions are, of course, functions of the information set at which they are chosen. Thus, strategies are decision rules that map the history of the game into the available action sets. Since there is a large number of banks, there is a large number of possible information sets. For simplicity, we only consider information sets in which almost all banks and managers have made the same choices. Further, note that in our context individual players have no effect on subsequent play of the game. To complete the proof that the incentive-efficient allocation is the outcome of a SPE, we should specify optimal actions for every possible subgame (which we will not bother to do here). By the same token dollarization may be costly to adopt. The important issue of the transition to a dollarized system is not considered in the paper but might prove crucial.
Indeed, dollarization could bring the banking system down when implemented in a crisis context. The tough recent experience of Ecuador comes to mind. To address this issue a dynamic model would be needed.
Our analysis builds on the fact that dollarization represents a commitment to a limited use of a LOLR facility. With dollarization a certain amount of help can be pre-arranged.
However, this is typically not sufficient to deal with a major banking crisis and may be a Let us consider now a small open economy in which the safe asset is the dollar and the currency of the country is the peso. The country is small and therefore the only way to affect the exchange rate is by changing the price level. Indeed, the exchange rate is just the peso price of consumption. We assume that international borrowing is not possible.
We will consider two scenarios, full dollarization and partial dollarization. A necessary condition for dollarization to be good is that a moral hazard problem for the banker is present. Indeed, the central bank (with no commitment power) will achieve an efficient allocation when the moral hazard problem of the banker does not exist ( ). Paradoxically, a severe moral hazard problem of the banker ( high) may hurt the chances of dollarization. We know that is nonincreasing (decreasing) in (when the incentive constraint binds) while is independent of . When is high, it becomes expensive to provide incentives and it may be that Dollarization will be good ( ) when:
1. Effort is important to improve returns ( is much worse than for all (1) = (1)
(1) (1) (0) ) ( 1 ) ( 0 ) (1) (0) ( (1) (0)) ( 1 ) (1) (0)
In the presence of a moral hazard problem for the banker, dollarization will be welfare improving when effort is important to increase returns and the cost of liquidation is not too high is close to . However, a severe moral hazard
problem ( high) may induce
Note that, contrary to our assumption, we have an unbounded support for with the normal distribution. When there is no liquidation cost ( ) the central bank may liquidate the bank in period in the ex ante efficient manner. However, we may also think realistically that in period 1, given that the central banker will be indifferent between liquidating the bank when and not liquidating it, he will yield to the pressure of the bank manager and not liquidate it. Furthermore, there is a conceivable knife-edge case for which . This would happen if . However, when the distribution of has a two-point support, is a robust possibility.
). Indeed, the central bank (with no commitment power) will achieve an efficient allocation when effort makes no difference ( for all The rst two features are typical of a country with a long way to go in terms of political stability, rule of law, contract enforcement, institutional development, and supervision and that relies on bank monitoring to make nance available for entrepreneurial projects.
For politically stable countries with a modern institutional structure and deep nancial markets, dollarization is not likely to be a good idea. However, we have also seen that if the moral hazard problem is very severe dollarization may be welfare reducing. For dollarization to be good the moral hazard problem cannot be hopeless and incentive provision cannot be extremely costly. This points at an intermediate range of countries with a weak institutional structure but without an extreme agency problem.
Our results should be contrasted with those on the time consistency of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott [1977] and Barro and Gordon [1983] ). In those models the absence VII From theory to measurement and policy money supply will be expanded, in ation will accelerate and households will demand high nominal interest rates, which will translate into high real rates (this is the peso problem ).
The result is a further weakening of the banking system. This may have happened in the recent banking crisis in Ecuador.
These considerations point at the potential instability of partial dollarization without external help providing credibility to the program.
We have identi ed a series of theoretical forces that go for and against dollarization.
The question arises about how to measure them: What observable variables can we look at to check whether for a particular country dollarization is a good idea from the point of view of banking stability? In this section we put the model to work by establishing a link between the parameters in our model and observable country variables; and assessing what countries would bene t most with dollarization.
We will consider a universe of countries where dollarization may be an issue and from which we have been able to gather some data. We concentrate attention on Latin America and South East Asia although we consider also Turkey in the periphery of Europe. Those 
Moral hazard
This ranking is in ation-based and weights the three indexes according to their relative contribution in explaining the variations in the rate of depreciation of the value of the currency. See Table 21 .1 in Cukierman [1992] . See Table 19 .4 in Cukierman [1992] . While the legal or institutional indexes of central bank independence do not appear to be correlated with in ation in LDCs, the turnover rate of governors is (see Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti [1992] ; the results are con rmed by Fry [1998] marginal returns will be captured by others, which increases the marginal cost of ensuring high returns. We classify the marks given in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) into low, medium and high (Table I) .
We summarize in Table II . The importance of effort by bank managers for project returns can be proxied by the relevance of banks in the nancial system. This can be measured by the amount of bank assets to total nancial assets. In the countries of our sample only South Korea is below .50 (with no data for Hong Kong, Indonesia and Singapore). For Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, the Philippines and Taiwan is above .80.
Note that there is a link between the (indirect) moral hazard indicators given before (related to the rule of law and accounting standards) and the importance of effort by the banking manager to obtain returns. In countries with a severe or signi cant moral hazard problem with the rms in the private sector, suggested by low marks in the rule of law indexes, effort by the bank manager will also be important. This means that, perhaps with exception of Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, effort to obtain returns is bound to be important in our set of countries.
. . These indicators, taken together, point to a middle range of countries where dollarization can be a good idea from the point of view of banking stability. Those countries are at the intersection of signi cant or moderate levels of the moral hazard problem (Table II) with medium or low levels of the cost of liquidation (Table III) We should warn the reader however that our model can be used only as a rst screening device to assess the costs and bene ts of dollarization for the stability of the banking system. A deeper country by country study should be conducted to reach a more de nitive policy conclusion.
Given that dollarization has costs in terms of excessive liquidation welfare could be improved either with a partial and credible dollarization or with the intervention of an international LOLR like a reformed IMF. Let us explore the potential role of the IMF.
The central problem of implementing the incentive-efficient solution is how to provide help without losing the commitment capacity to avoid helping when ex ante efficiency requires it. An independent IMF may be just what is needed. This is how it could be done. The IMF could provide a loan only when the country has enough collateral (more than in terms of our model). The IMF should provide help in the range The reason is that the IMF is seen as preferred creditor and therefore not repaying the IMF means essentially being denied access to the international capital market [Fischer 1999] . Including, among other things, that the country meets, or move in the direction of meeting, international standards (in information provision in particular, Special Data Dissemination Standards). See Chapman [1999] and Moreno-Villalaz [1999] .
Obviously to determine the minimum required amount of collateral (and the range where help has to be provided) a supervisory knowledge of the (relevant parameters of the) economy is needed and therefore the IMF should have supervisory capacity. What is interesting is that the reason why a minimum amount of collateral is needed for help is not to secure the loan but to impose a threshold below which help is not given. Although the IMF can ask for collateral it rarely does so. Instead the IMF requires policy conditionality for the loan. However, according to our analysis, what makes sense is conditionality in terms of rule of law and accounting standards because it avoids lending to countries where the moral hazard problem is hopeless.
This requires an IMF with a statute which provides independence (along the lines, for example, of De Gregorio, Eichengreen, Ito, and Wyplosz [1998] ). This is crucial to avoid granting help when it is not ex ante efficient to do so and therefore contributing to moral hazard. In summary, a reformed IMF would need to be independent, lend on the basis of collateral, and require a minimal institutional infrastructure for the country.
To be sure, another line of argument would insist that with dollarization the domestic banking system will fall into foreign hands anyway and therefore bailouts could be provided by strong international banks supervised abroad and supported by their respective central banks. Indeed, local banks are being bought in Latin America by strong international banks (with solid collateral). This solution has been successful in a country like Panama where there is no LOLR facility except for, seemingly, a large US bank. However, it is doubtful that international banking can be the sole answer to the problem. This is because the private incentives of the international banks and those of foreign LOLR and supervisors are not in line with local interests. Indeed, neither a private bank nor a foreign supervisor will take into account the consequences (systemic or not) for domestic residents 45 
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See Vives [2001] for an analysis of similar problems in the European context. of a restructuring of a local branch or subsidiary. At the same time the headquarters of foreign banks may want to limit the exposure to a country which may face a currency crisis, therefore tightening liquidity provision to the branches of the bank in the country in question.
The market failure that the IMF is addressing is derived from the lack of commitment capacity of domestic institutions. The view [Chari and Kehoe 1998 ] that an International LOLR is not needed because the joint action of the Fed, the ECB and the BoJ can take care of any international liquidity problem does not take into account problems that may be systemic in small dollarized countries but non-systemic worldwide. We believe therefore that there is room for an International LOLR. Mean of German = 62.7
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